Analysis
War Support Monitor
How public support for military aid, sanctions, negotiations and troop deployment is changing in Europe, the UK, the US, Ukraine and Russia, built from published polls with the date and source of every figure.
Figures come from published polls and are updated when new waves appear. Questions differ between pollsters, so compare values within the same series.
Main findings
- 1Majorities in most EU countries tracked still back financing weapons for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, but support is edging down: 57% EU-wide in autumn 2025 and 56% in spring 2026 for military equipment. Italy is split and Hungary is the clear exception.
- 2Sanctions are the most widely supported measure: from 49% (Hungary) to 86% (Poland) in the EU countries tracked here, and 69% in the United States, including 70% of Republicans.
- 3Sending troops is a minority position almost everywhere: 26–37% in the EU countries tracked here (ECFR, May 2026) and 31% in the U.S. Of the countries tracked, only Britain reaches half (51%).
- 4Ukrainians are war-weary but unwilling to concede: 66% want a negotiated end as soon as possible, yet 61% call giving up Donbas for security guarantees categorically unacceptable. Strong guarantees, such as European troops near the front, nearly double acceptance of a ceasefire.
- 5Most Russians favour peace talks (59–67% in every 2026 survey) while about 70% still say they support the army's actions. Young people lean most towards talks, and ending the war by returning annexed territory remains unpopular.
- 6In the United States, party is the deciding factor: 71% of Democrats but 48% of Republicans favour military aid, and Republican opinion has moved with the administration's position.
Figures last reviewed:
How support is measured
The monitor tracks four separate measures. They are asked differently, so each is shown on its own and never merged into a single 'support' score.
- Military aid
- Support for supplying or financing weapons and military aid to Ukraine. Wordings differ: EU respondents are asked whether they agree with the EU financing military equipment; U.S. polls ask whether America is doing 'too much' or 'not enough', or whether people favour military aid.
- Sanctions on Russia
- Support for imposing, keeping or tightening economic sanctions on Russia's government, companies and individuals.
- Negotiations
- Preference for a negotiated end to the war. In Ukraine and Russia this is the main question pollsters track. A higher value means more people favour talks now; it does not by itself mean support for any particular terms.
- Troop deployment
- Support for sending national troops to Ukraine, usually as peacekeepers or a reassurance force after a ceasefire or peace deal. In Ukraine, the question is whether people would accept a ceasefire if European troops were stationed near the front.
Compare countries
Only questions asked the same way in every country are compared.
Country profiles
European Union
Baltic states
UK, US, Ukraine, Russia
Germany
Trend over time
- Military aid: Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer)
- Sanctions on Russia: Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer)
- Troop deployment: Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR)
Each line is one question from one pollster. Dashed lines show the opposite answer to the same question.
Key drivers
- Support for financing weapons is steady at 63%, but a little over four in ten said in September 2026 that weapons support goes too far. Opposition outweighs support in eastern Germany and among AfD supporters. European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104 · infratest dimap — ARD-DeutschlandTREND
- About a third (36%) would send German troops after a peace deal, and AfD voters mostly see Ukraine as a rival or adversary. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Cost is contested: the Kiel Institute found that only about €41.7 billion of Germany's reported €100 billion in 'bilateral aid' actually reached Ukraine. Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Differences by party, age or region
No published breakdown by party, age or region in the sources used.
All figures and sources
| Measure | Question | Support | Fieldwork | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military aid | Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) | 63% | Oct – Nov 2025 | European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104 |
| Military aid | Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) | 63%(derived) | Mar – Apr 2025 | European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104 |
| Sanctions on Russia | Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) | 75% | Oct – Nov 2025 | European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104 |
| Sanctions on Russia | Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) | 76%(derived) | Mar – Apr 2025 | European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104 |
| Troop deployment | Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) | 36% | 30 Apr – 13 May 2026 | European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) |
Data limitations
- Questions differ between pollsters and countries, so values are comparable only within the same series (same pollster and wording). The comparison chart only uses questions asked identically across countries.
- Russia: polling takes place under wartime censorship and criminal penalties for 'discrediting the army'. Researchers disagree on how much fear and refusals distort answers; one study of 42 phone polls found no fall in participation, while critics point to unknown refusal rates and socially desirable answers. Treat levels with caution; trends within Levada's series are more informative. Post-Soviet Affairs (Taylor & Francis) · The Insider
- Ukraine: polls cover only government-controlled territory. They exclude people in occupied areas and refugees who left after February 2022, and wartime telephone surveys add bias that pollsters say they cannot quantify. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) · Gallup
- Eurobarometer country figures for spring 2026 were not publicly available when this page was reviewed. Country trends therefore use spring and autumn 2025; spring 2025 values are derived from the change Eurobarometer prints beside the autumn figures and are marked as derived. European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104
- Most figures have a margin of error of about ±2 to ±5 points, so small month-to-month changes may be noise. A few points are older than 12 months; they are kept to show the direction of travel and dated clearly.
- Social media and news sentiment is not measured here. The page cites published polls and analyses only, never individual users. The daily scan lists new publications from pollsters and think tanks; figures change only when new polls are published and reviewed.
Downloads
New publications to review
Scanned daily from pollsters and think tanks (Levada, Pew, ECFR, Chatham House, RUSI, Carnegie, CSIS, Brookings, IISS, Kiel Institute, KIIS, YouGov, Gallup, Eurobarometer). New figures are added to the monitor after review.
- What’s Behind South Korea’s Rift With Ukraine and Turn Toward Russia?
13 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- More than Ukraine: How the Abu Dhabi talks laid bare Russia’s priorities
13 November 2026 · ECFR
- How Realistic Is a U.S.-Brokered Gas Deal Between Russia and the EU?
13 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Are New U.S.-Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks Doomed to Fail Again?
12 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Taking the Pulse: Can Europe Fund Ukraine Without Russian Assets?
12 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Exposure to violence and prosocial attitudes in war-torn Ukraine – Anastasiia Arbuzova
12 November 2026 · Kiel Institute
- Reforming Ukraine’s veteran support system: What’s working and what’s at stake?
11 November 2026 · Chatham House
- By Waging War on Its Sovereignty, Putin Has United Ukraine
6 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- How a U.S.-Russia Standoff Ended a Decades-Old UN Mission in Western Sahara
5 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Is Russia Winning the Perception War in Germany?
5 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Red Sea Mirage: Why Russia Is Still Waiting on a Military Base in Sudan
5 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Deportation of Russian Propagandist Reveals Battle Over Church Influence in the Balkans
4 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Cyber Attack on Ukraine's Air Raid Warning App
3 November 2026 · RUSI
- The Fallacy of Energy Deals With Russia
2 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Europe Struggles to Sustain Support for Ukraine
2 November 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Vučić’s Downfall in Serbia Is Fatal to Russia’s Influence in the Balkans
30 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Will Peace Talks With Russia Ever Work?
29 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- The Foundations of a Russian Dictatorship: The Kremlin’s New Ideology
29 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Trade Sanctions: Evidence From Russia
28 October 2026 · Kiel Institute
- Press releases and reports - Russian strikes on Ukraine, Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, and trust in the President: results of a survey conducted from October 16 to 25, 2026
28 October 2026 · KIIS
- Putin’s Post-Election Reshuffle Advances Russian State Erosion
27 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- Price Analysis Shows China Holds Upper Hand in Russia Gas Supply Talks
23 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment
- LiveNOW Fox: Is Putin serious about peace with Ukraine?
22 October 2026 · RUSI
- Report: Hong Kong becomes a hub for Russia and Iran to circumvent sanctions; urging the US to increase financial pressure
20 October 2026 · RUSI
- The Future of Russian-European Relations Is Bleak
19 October 2026 · Carnegie Endowment